Fair Division Under Inaccurate Preferences
Trung Dang, Daniel Halpern, Anuran Makur,
Alexandros Psomas, Japneet Singh, and Paritosh Verma
arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.24169, 2026
We explore the broad landscape of fair division of indivisible items given inaccurate cardinal preferences, with a focus on minimizing envy. We consider various settings based on whether the true preferences of the agents are stochastic or worst-case, and whether the inaccuracies, modeled as additive noise, are stochastic or worst-case. When the true preferences are stochastic, we show that envy-free allocations can be computed with high probability; this is achieved both in the setting with stochastic and worst-case noise. When the true preferences are worst-case, and the noise is bounded, we analyze the maximum envy achieved by the well-known Round-Robin algorithm. Lastly, we consider a setting with worst-case preferences and noise, where the true preferences for each item are revealed upon its allocation. Here, we give an efficient online algorithm that guarantees logarithmic maximum envy with high probability, for bounded noise. This result builds upon and generalizes a known result from algorithmic discrepancy to a setting with noisy input data.